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[Note to readers of this SSRN version of the testimony. Footnotes 1 and 2 were in the
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footnotes not submitted to the subcommittee. The hearing was called with very little
notice, and so both my testimony and that of other witnesses was necessarily put together
in haste. Annotation in the footnotes seems like the best way of filling in gaps and
clarifying matters in various places.]
Honorable Chairman and Members:
1. Introduction
2. My thanks to the Subcommittee, the Chairman and Members for inviting me to
return to offer further testimony on the subject of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and “drone warfare.”
3. My name is Kenneth Anderson. I am a professor of law at Washington College of
Law, American University, Washington DC, and a member of the Hoover Task
Force on National Security and Law, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University,
Stanford CA. My areas of specialty include the laws of war and armed conflict,
international law, and national security law. (A brief biography is attached to this
statement.)
4. This testimony follows on earlier testimony that I offered to this Subcommittee on
March 23, 2010, on the general strategic and legal issues surrounding the use of
drones by both the US military and the CIA in counterterrorism operations
worldwide. That earlier testimony, which I do not repeat here, is available at the
Subcommittee website.1 (In addition, two additional background documents on
this topic – an article in the Weekly Standard, “Predators Over Pakistan,” and a
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policy chapter in a Brookings Institution volume, “Targeted Killing in US
Counterterrorism Strategy and Law,” are also downloadable at SSRN.com.)2
5. DOS Legal Adviser Harold Koh’s March 25, 2010 Statement
6. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the State Department, delivered an important
speech on international law at the American Society for International Law on
March 25, 2010, in which, for the first time, a senior lawyer – indeed, the most
senior lawyer on international law – delivered a defense of the lawfulness of the
US use of drone warfare.3
7. As someone who has been a sharp critic of the silence of the administration’s
senior lawyers on this crucial topic (indeed, in my earlier testimony before this
Subcommittee, on March 23), I welcome and applaud the Legal Adviser’s
forthright and robust statement. Although relatively short and, as the Legal
Adviser noted, an authoritative and considered statement of US legal views rather
than a formal legal opinion, it went a long way to assuaging concerns I had
expressed on whether the administration’s lawyers would stand with the political
leadership on so important an issue.
8. The Legal Adviser’s statement was noteworthy on several grounds. They include
particularly the unmistakable and repeated distinction drawn between “armed
conflict” in a strict legal sense and “self defense” as a separate basis for the use of
force by the United States. In addition, the statement defended the development
of such technologies and the efforts by the United States to develop
technologically more sophisticated means of targeting and reducing collateral
damage. It stated that there was no obligation to provide targets with “process”
prior to striking. And it specifically stated that whether in armed conflict or selfdefense, such operations did not violate the US domestic ban on “assassination.”4
2

Kenneth Anderson, “Predators Over Pakistan,” Weekly Standard, March 8, 2010, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1561229. Kenneth Anderson, “Targeted Killing in US
Counterterrorism Strategy and Law,” in Benjamin Wittes, ed., Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda
for Reform (2009 Brookings Institution Press), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1415070. In addition, I have blogged extensively on
this topic at the international law professor blog, Opinio Juris, www.opiniojuris.org, and at the law
professor blog, Volokh Conspiracy, www.volokh.com.
3
Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to Department of State, “International Law and the Obama Administration,”
March 25, 2010, speech delivered to the American Society of International Law, full text at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. The speech covers many topics besides drone
warfare and self defense.
4
As journalist Adam Serwer correctly noted, in addition, though the speech is silent on the topic, nothing in
this statement precludes the targeting of an American citizen who otherwise meets the criteria for being
targeted as a matter of participation in armed conflict or legitimate self defense, whether by the US military
or the CIA, without warning or judicial process. Indeed, it can be read as an indirect defense of precisely
that proposition. See Adam Serwer post, April 12, 2010, http://progressiverealist.org/blogpost/did-haroldkoh-also-provide-legal-justification-targeted-killings-americans-suspected-terro. I discuss the issue at
Volokh Conspiracy legal academic blog, at http://volokh.com/2010/04/14/is-harold-kohs-defense-ofdrones-also-the-defense-of-targeting-a-us-citizen/.
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9. The comprehensiveness of this defense of drone warfare, on both armed conflict
and self-defense grounds, is impressive and persuasive, and is a major statement
of the US view of international law on this topic.
10. The fact that this statement was delivered by the Legal Adviser to the State
Department sends an important signal that this is not simply the view of DOD, or
the CIA, or any intelligence agency – but the view of the United States, expressed
as its “opinio juris,” its considered view of its own obligations under international
law, to the rest of the world.
11. The Distinction Between “Armed Conflict” and “Self-Defense”
12. As I testified on March 23, the fundamental question of drone warfare is not
really the technological platform, but instead where and who operates it.5 On a
traditional battlefield in the hands of the military, drones are simply another air
support platform; issues surrounding use, targeting, and collateral damage are no
different than for any other weapons system. The debate arises on two axes, one
related to self-defense, and the other related to the role of the CIA.
13. Is it lawful to use drones in uses of force that do not constitute “armed conflict”
with a non-state actor (Al Qaeda and similar groups) in a technical legal sense,
because where the drone strike might take place is far away from the current
places of hostilities? That question was answered firmly in the affirmative by the
Legal Adviser’s statement; such strikes can be justified, even though separate and
distinct from “armed conflict,” as lawful self-defense.
14. Such self-defense operations are not governed by the full panoply of treaty laws
that attach to armed conflict – neither the full range of armed conflict law that
applies conflicts between states, nor the limited Common Article 3 rules that
apply to conflict with a non-state actor.6 Strikes outside of armed conflict can be
5

In order to understand the range of quite different academic views, see the testimony of the other
witnesses as well as the transcript of the hearing. The witnesses were William Banks (Syracuse University
Law School), Mary Ellen O’Connell (Notre Dame Law School), David Glazier (Loyola Los Angeles Law
School), and myself; and written submissions from the ACLU and Michael Lewis (Ohio Northern
University). My congratulations to the hearing organizers for succeeding on short notice in getting a quite
representative range of views.
6
To be more precise, in my understanding there is not technically speaking “armed conflict” as such. As
scholar Marko Milanovic points out at the European Journal of International Law blog, “[International
armed conflicts] and [Non-international armed conflicts] are separate legal categories … an ‘armed
conflict’ exists when there is an IAC or a NIAC, not the other way around.” Marko Milanovic, EJILTalk!,
May 7, 2010, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/what-exactly-internationalizes-an-internal-armed-conflict/. Even
though increasingly the substantive rules of international armed conflict have been applied as a matter of
custom to non-international armed conflict, the threshold for showing when one or the other is underway
remains distinct under treaty and custom. Any fighting between state militaries constitutes an international
armed conflict for purposes of the Geneva Conventions and jus in bello under Geneva Conventions,
Common Article 2. The reference to conflict not of an international character in Geneva Conventions,
Common Article 3, contains no similar treaty threshold, but under customary law requires that there be
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undertaken under the doctrine of self-defense – and although lacking all the
technical rules that only make sense in overt, army-against-army fighting, such
self-defense operations must still adhere to fundamental customary law including,
as the Legal Adviser noted, the principles of distinction and proportionality that
are also foundations of the technical law of armed conflict. In other words, to say
that these operations are not governed by treaty law applicable to overt warfare is
not to say that they lack legal standards. On the contrary, they must adhere to the
customary standards of necessity, distinction, and proportionality.
15. The Legal Adviser’s statement reaffirms and reinvigorates the traditional US view
of self-defense, and I find little if anything in his statement that is inconsistent
with – indeed, in my view it is a clear reaffirmation – of a speech in 1989 by then
Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer on the topic of transnational terrorism and selfdefense.7
16. The Lawful Role of the CIA
17. As I noted in my March 23 testimony, if one crucial issue about drone warfare is
where it takes place – leading to the importance of the armed conflict/self-defense
distinction – a second crucial issue is who is lawfully empowered to carry it out.
In other words, the fault line in the argument over drone warfare is much less the
weapon system than who uses it and where. In the hands of the military on the
ordinary battlefield, it is not very different from other air platforms. The question,
of course, is off the ordinary battlefield and in the hands of the CIA.
18. The lawfulness of the CIA’s operations under US domestic law is not at issue.
The agency has been tasked by direct orders of the President, under the authority
of a complex statute that provides for oversight and accountability within and
sustained, intense, systematic fighting between organized forces, at a minimum. Why does this difference
in threshold matter? As I explain in my published articles, in the simplest terms, if you do not have an
armed conflict, because the fighting does not meet one of the two definitional forms of armed conflict, then
you do not have combatants to target. If you do not have combatants to target, then either you have a
justification for targeting them under the broader rules of self-defense law, or you possibly have a problem
with general human rights law, i.e., questions of extrajudicial execution. All branches of the US
government have characterized the conflict with Al Qaeda – however apparently peculiar a rubric – as
conflict not of an international character, because of the non-state actor nature of Al Qaeda. As a
consequence, the armed conflict cannot be as a matter of law governed under Common Article 2, because
Al Qaeda is not a state. If governed under Common Article 3, as all branches of the US government have
accepted for now many years, then there is only a conflict insofar as fighting achieves a required customary
level of sustained intensity. The further question is whether, for purposes of making that determination,
one can aggregate all the fighting wherever it takes place as a single non-international armed conflict. My
own view is that the more legally proper approach, as well as the more useful policy mechanism, is to
accept as the United States and other states have long done – and resort to the broader category of use of
force under the international law of self-defense. Not all uses of force, in other words, must be lawfully a
matter of either law enforcement or armed conflict. In this, however, I directly contravene Mary Ellen
O’Connell and various other legal scholars; on the other hand, this is a reasonably close rendering of the
State Department view.
7
Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, “Solf Lecture: “Terrorism, the Law, and
the National Defense,” Military Law Review (1989), Vol. 126, Issue 1, pp. 89-123.
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between the political branches.8 The fundamental challenges come from
influential parts of the “international law community” – NGOs, international
organizations, activists, academics, UN officials, and others – who view the use of
targeted killing as unlawful under international law, or likely so, and particularly
so by the CIA and outside of the technical scope of armed conflict.
19. Drone warfare becomes controversial, in other words, almost entirely when it is
used by the CIA – and in places outside of the Afghanistan, or a narrow slice of
cross border regions with Pakistan. Used as a weapon in counterinsurgency by
the US military, it is just another weapon. Used as a weapon in counterterrorism,
however, directed against Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership away from the active
locales of hostilities, whether further afield in Pakistan or still further afield in
Yemen, Somalia, or elsewhere, by the civilian CIA – that is where the sharp
arguments mostly take place.
20. The Legal Adviser nowhere mentions the CIA by name in his defense of drone
operations. It is, of course, what is plainly intended when speaking of selfdefense separate from armed conflict. One understands the hesitation of senior
lawyers to name the CIA’s use of drones as lawful when the official position of
the US government, despite everything, is still not to confirm or deny the CIA’s
operations.
21. In my view, the next step in this evolving legal process should be to affirm what
the Legal Adviser’s statement says without naming the CIA. That process might
involve the US government, in a no doubt difficult interagency consultation, in
establishing new mechanisms for acknowledging operations that are widely
known, widely discussed even by senior officials – if not operationally, then at
least for the “hypothetical” of asserting their legality. In my view, it would be
best to establish a formal category of unacknowledged but also obviously not
covert operations by the CIA, with their own mechanisms of Congressional
oversight and accountability.
22. The Legal Adviser’s statement has announced the framework and done everything
but say the words “CIA.” It is time to take the next step and say “the CIA.” The
officers of the CIA who carry out these operations, whether planning or
execution, merit the public acknowledgment that what they do is legal.
23. Congress ought to make clear, through pronouncement and resolutions and, even
better, through legislation, that any attempts to use international or foreign legal
process to go after these officers in pursuit of their duties at the intelligence
agencies would be regarded as a serious and unfriendly act toward the United
States. It is crucial that the two political branches send a single message that the
United States stands behind its self-defense operations as such.

8
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24. Distinctions in the CIA’s Roles in Drone Warfare
25. The distinction between operations in armed conflict, as a technical legal status,
and self-defense operations raises a legal issue that has been at the center of some
of the criticism of CIA operations. Some commentators, including eminent laws
of war scholars, have suggested that the activities of the CIA operating drones
(including from locales in the United States) in the context of the armed conflict
in AfPak constitutes unlawful combatancy by CIA personnel.9
26. The question is not an idle one, if the State Department’s position of a distinction
between these two grounds for using force is accepted. The legal rules applicable
to participants are different as between these two statuses. In an armed conflict,
the rules by which combatants must distinguish themselves in order to qualify for
combatant immunity apply, and there is a question as to whether that applies to
CIA personnel whose activity is part of the armed conflict underway in the
Afghanistan or Pakistan theatres.
27. I do not propose to offer here a detailed or definitive answer to the complex
question of when and who is required, for example, to wear uniforms and what
those must be in order to meet the requirements of the law of armed conflict. My
understanding of the DOD view with regards to its own special forces in the early
stages of the Afghanistan war, for example, was that context mattered and that US
special forces, while commingled with Northern Alliance fighters, could dress as
those militia fighters did, and meet the requirements. Context matters, including
personnel flying a drone from an office in the United States.10
28. In addition to the question of uniforms and marks identifying combatants, these
questions also raise important questions for the United States, and DOD
particularly, as to the lawful role of civilians in armed conflict. It is partly a
question of the lawful role of civilians in support of US combatant forces, as well
as when persons on the other side become lawful targets. The underlying
question is the much-vexed topic in international law of war over what constitutes
“direct participation in hostilities” (DPH).11 The views that most matter on this
are those of the DOD, and I believe it is premature to opine on them until DOD
has expressed an official view.12
9

See, e.g., Gary Solis, “CIA Attacks Produce America’s Own Unlawful Combatants,” Washington Post,
March 10, 2010, opinion.
10
See Hays Parks, “Special Forces Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms,” Chicago Journal of International
Law Vol. 4, No. 2, Fall 2003, at 493.
11
In particular, the controversies surrounding the International Committee of the Red Cross, “Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities,” June 2009.
12
I assume that guidance as to the DOD view will be offered in the forthcoming revision of the laws of war
manual. On reflection, however, I believe that the following can be said, at a minimum. So far as I am
aware, it is compatible with DOD legal views on DPH.
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29. Similarly controversial and important is what constitutes the “armed conflict” in
AfPak – does it cover all of Pakistan, so that these questions of DPH by CIA
personnel matter as a matter of armed conflict law? Or are parts of Pakistan
outside of the active border zones of overt hostilities – such that CIA operations
there take place instead under the rationale of “self-defense,” and so outside of the
technical rules of armed conflict, including the formal rules for combatancy? I do
not have definitive views on these questions, but I believe they are appropriate to
put to the administration, DOD as well as DOS and the CIA, and to encourage the
executive to express a view that it believes can serve as a long-run basis for US
practice and legal policy.13
First, with respect to CIA participation in an armed conflict, taking the plainest case of AfPak, or fighting
that has developed into a conventional war of some kind in Pakistan. The CIA can take part as civilians on
the battlefield who have taken up arms as part of a party to a conflict, as noted in the Geneva Conventions;
the participation of its agents is not unlawful nor does it render them “unlawful combatants.” Rather, by
their DPH they make themselves lawful targets to the other side – if, however, the other side were legally
entitled to take up arms in any sense. That is, if the enemy on the other side were a party – North Korea,
for example – that would have belligerent rights, then its armed forces would be entitled to target civilian
CIA taking DPH, and the “institution” perhaps as well. However, a terrorist organization – whether Al
Qaeda or ETA or the IRA – has no right to target anyone, including armed forces that would otherwise be
lawful to target in an armed conflict.
Touching the wearing of uniforms by the CIA, it is not formally bound – under the strict language of the
Geneva Conventions – to the formal requirements imposed on resistance groups that are not the armed
forces of a state or its affiliated forces. However, those rules essentially encapsulate more general rules
against “perfidy” and commingling with non-combatants, and so they are important even if not formal
requirements. That said, the wearing of uniforms or not in a CIA office at Langley presents no issues of
perfidy or other violation of rules of war, and is not a binding requirement on these civilians taking DPH. I
defer to DOD interpretations of when uniforms are required or not, or when and what kinds of non-standard
uniforms are acceptable.
Second, with respect to CIA use of force outside of an armed conflict, in what Legal Adviser Koh termed
“legitimate self-defense,” whether in covert operations or drone strikes, the CIA makes no claim of
combatant privilege or concept drawn from the (inapplicable) law of armed conflict for its agents. They
have no claim to lawful combatant status. Their acts almost certainly constitute a violation of local law,
including laws against espionage. When the US military acts clandestinely, the pact with servicemembers
is that even if it is a secret operation, military personnel will always be acknowledged, and POW status
demanded. The CIA makes no such claim for its civilian operatives outside of armed conflict.
As to the general self-defense claim, as a matter of jus ad bellum international law, it indeed constitutes a
violation of sovereignty; the view of the US has been for a very long time that legitimate self-defense,
including against terrorists taking safe haven in a state unable or unwilling to control its territory, is a
sufficient affirmative defense in international law. There is nothing novel about this claim; it does not arise
with the Obama administration or the Bush administration, but goes back at least to the 1980s and almost
certainly long before.
13
Even if one accepts, as I do, that the CIA’s role in an armed conflict in Pakistan, or in AfPak, is lawful
under US and international law, there is a further important policy question as to whether it is a good policy
idea for the CIA to be taking part in a conventional conflict, rather than confining itself to covert operations
in much more extraordinary circumstances of self-defense as such. The most important justification for its
role now in Pakistan is that it offers a fig leaf for the Pakistan government to say that the US military is not
fighting in Pakistan. That might well be a sufficient policy reason, but the question should be debated and
general policy lines drawn, even if exceptions might be made.
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30. That said, I do not believe that the CIA’s current participation either in the theatre
of hostilities or elsewhere is unlawful or contrary to international law under the
laws of war or otherwise.14 There might, however, be useful prophylactic
measures that could be taken to make that evident.
31. I believe it is appropriate for Congress to ask that the administration undertake a
process to formulate a view of the participation of CIA personnel in an armed
conflict and what that means – a process that would likely be difficult because of
issues of interagency review. However, in order to put the CIA’s activities on the
best long-run legal footing, I believe that Congress should urge the administration
to undertake what might be an arduous process of consultation and formulation of
views.
32. Why Ever the CIA? Why Not Always the US Military to Use Force?
33. Lurking just behind many of the questions about the lawfulness of the CIA’s use
of drones, where and how, is a much bigger policy issue. Congress ought to
address it forthrightly. Why should the CIA, or any other civilian agency, ever
use force (leaving aside conventional law enforcement)? Even granting the
existence of self-defense as a legal category, why ever have force used by anyone
other than the uniformed military? Drones raise this question if for no other
reason that they can be operated far away from the strike zone, whether by CIA or
military personnel. Why ever have the CIA use force?
34. That question is in some sense beyond what a hearing such as this can answer, but
I raise it because one way or another, it needs to be addressed. It is behind many
of the criticisms that are perennial in this activity. For this testimony, suffice it to
say that the United States and many, many other leading countries in the world
have found that there are circumstances that both justify the use of covert force,
and that serious judgments as to the avoidance of greater harms is best served not
by overt military force, but by covert or clandestine force, using civilians.
35. Those judgments might in any instance turn out to be wrong, but as a matter of
international practice, states have both possessed and utilized clandestine civilian
agents, without acknowledging them, in the past and today. The CIA offers to the
President the ability to undertake operations of self-defense on a covert basis that
this country – and likewise its friends and enemies alike – has deemed essential
since the founding of the CIA at least. I raise this because it is important to
recognize that not infrequently, arguments against drones are really proxy for
arguments against the very idea of the CIA using force. That is an important
argument to have, perhaps, but better to have it on its own terms, not indirectly by
arguing about drones.

14

See footnote 12 for a brief discussion.
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36. Finally, to be clear, the use of drones, or other use of force by civilian CIA agents
in covert operations is not contrary to international law insofar as it is an exercise
of lawful self-defense. The traditional view of the United States, as expressed in
1989 and reaffirmed today, is sovereignty and territorial integrity are very
important in international law, but they cannot be used to shield transnational
terrorists who have found safe haven.
37. Targeting US Citizens
38. Press accounts that the Obama administration had affirmatively placed the radical
cleric, Anwar Al-Awlaki, currently presumed hiding in Yemen with Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), on the kill-or-capture list and, thus, subject to a
drone targeted killing attack, raised some excited discussion in the United States.
The fundamental question was whether, under international law or US domestic
law, the US government owed a targeted individual some form of judicial process
before targeting him or her, or whether perhaps it was unlawful to target the
person at all in favor of attempting to arrest and bring for trial under a law
enforcement model of counterterrorism.
39. Commentators have correctly noted that that Legal Adviser’s statement on drones
covers not just targeted killing but, once seen in the context of a US citizen on the
kill-or-capture list, is equally a statement that even a US citizen who has joined
forces with transnational terrorists and is hiding abroad might be subject to
targeted killing. The existing domestic law for making such a determination, the
Legal Adviser’s statement implies, is sufficient, and there is no obligation in US
or international law to provide other process, such as judicial review, before a
possible strike. Moreover, this is not an act of assassination, within the meaning
of the US domestic prohibition, according to the Legal Adviser’s statement. All
of this seems to me correct as a matter of law and policy.15
40. It bears noting, however, that the Legal Adviser’s distinction between armed
conflict and self-defense is equally relevant here as in other contexts. That is, it is
not necessary that, for example, Al-Awlaki, be a “combatant” to be subject to a
strike by the CIA. The legal justification of self-defense is separately available as
15

In my view, journalist Adam Serwer is correct in making this analysis of the Legal Adviser’s speech to
ASIL, at Tapped, The American Prospect Blog, April 12, 2010, “Did Harold Koh Just Justify the Killing of
an American Citizen?” My legal position is that American citizenship is no protection against targeting if
one has joined forces with the enemy, though there is room for debate as to what constitutes doing that, or
evidence of doing that; I have seen nothing publicly revealed that would undermine the President’s
determination, though of course I have no special possession of secret facts. I also believe that the role of
courts in this matter is extremely limited, in dealing with someone who has fled abroad, is asserted by the
President under procedures designed to inform Congress to be involved in activities to which, if a nonAmerican, the United States would be justified in attacking on the basis of self-defense. I see little or no
role for the courts in second-guessing the political branches in such a determination. However, I would
also suggest that it would be a useful prophylactic measure – in this as with other things related to covert
uses of force – for a strengthening of the oversight procedures so that it is clear that Congress is fully
informed in a timely way.
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a basis to attack. The standard in that case is not “combatancy,” but the threat
posed, immanence, and other traditional factors – including the US’s long
embrace of “active self-defense,” meaning that a threat can be assessed on the
basis of a pattern of activity already established in the past, without having to wait
until a target is on the verge of acting.
41. Many of the critics of this policy in the United States seem not to appreciate that
there is a distinction between the territorial United States, in which the CIA is not
authorized to act, and extraterritorially.
42. Critics also frequently raise the spectre that all this is license for the CIA to attack
an American – or frankly anyone – in, for example, London or Paris. As stated in
my March 23 testimony, however, what is justified in the ungoverned regions of
Somalia or Yemen is a different matter applied to places under the rule of law
such as our friends and allies. The United States is not going to undertake a
targeted killing in London. The diplomatic fiction of the “sovereign equality” of
states makes it difficult to say, as a matter of international law that, yes, Yemen is
different from France, but of course that is true.16
43. The willingness of the Obama administration to assert plainly that it has no
trouble targeting an American citizen who has taken up the cause of violence
against the United States and its citizens is a positive sign of resolve in
counterterrorism by the administration. For one thing, it lessens at least slightly
the incentive of terrorist groups to recruit Americans, which is likely to be no
small matter over the long term. But as to the fundamental propriety of targeting
an American without judicial process, extraterritorially?
44. The policy is far from unprecedented. Suppose that an American scientist in the
Cold War had decided to defect to the Soviet Union with vital nuclear secrets that
went to the heart of the US strategic arsenal. US citizen, and not military, and not
a combatant, because despite the existence of a Cold War, no actual military
conflict was underway. The CIA finds that its best chance to remove the threat is
a sniper attack on the US scientist in East Berlin as he attempts to enter the Soviet

16

This issue has not received enough discussion – why it is acceptable under some circumstances to do in
Yemen or, for that matter, Iran what would not be acceptable in London. It is not strictly speaking a matter
of international law because international law, by definition as it were, assumes the sovereign equality of
states. But from a security and self-defense standpoint, that is far from true. The more accurate legal
reason – a reason that is more than simply politics, diplomacy, or prudence, but a genuinely legal one – is
not international law as such, but the more general comparative law notion of “comity.” Comity requires,
however, some sense of similarity among states that is more than simply the formal equality of sovereignty;
for the same reasons that we consider comparables in determining whether it is permissible to extradite
someone to some jurisdiction, we consider the same issues in determining whether or not a targeted killing
would be so much as a possibility. This is a matter of law in the comity, which assumes that the question
should be asked which, under general international law, does not get asked – are ‘they’ enough like ‘us’? I
discuss this point at more length in Kenneth Anderson, “Targeted Killing in US Counterinsurgency
Strategy and Law,” in Benjamin Wittes, ed., Legislating the War on Terror: An Agenda for Reform
(Brookings 2009), at chapter 10.
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embassy. Far fetched? Not really. Not an armed conflict and not a “combatant”
in a technical legal sense – a US citizen targeted without judicial process, abroad,
and under rationales of self-defense. The same concepts apply today, with respect
to transnational terrorists, including Americans who take up the cause with them.
45. A Role for Congress?
46. This testimony has highlighted several matters on which Congress could play an
important and useful role, primarily in offering support to the policies undertaken
by the administration. One of these is to encourage and provide opportunities for
other senior lawyers in the intelligence and defense communities to affirm,
amplify, and expand on what the Legal Adviser has said.
47. A second role for Congress – and a deeply important one – is to specifically name
the CIA as under the protection, so to speak, of these legal views on self-defense.
This is of great importance in order to make clear that line officers and legal
officials of the CIA are not being put in the untenable position of being tasked to
carry out policies for which they might later be accused of violations of
international law. Congress needs to clarify its lawfulness, and frankly make
clear that countries that seek to gainsay the US’s own considered legal view on
this topic, including allies and NATO allies, such as unsupervised prosecutors in
Spain or elsewhere, will discover that there are consequences.
48. Congress should also invite the administration to elaborate its views of CIA
actions inside Pakistan, to state whether it thinks such activities are part of the ongoing armed conflict, are separate from it, and how such views interact with legal
doctrines of DPH. This is a topic on which there needs to be a coordinated legal
view among DOS, DOD, CIA, DNI, and perhaps others.
49. Congress should explicitly endorse the Obama administration’s view that
American citizenship does not preclude one from being targeted extraterritorially
under laws of armed conflict, self-defense or US domestic law.
50. Congress should be strongly supporting, through budget processes and otherwise,
the development of more discrete and discriminating drone-and-missile
technologies to reduce collateral damage to the minimum that technology can
allow, as well as to improve targeting identification.17

17

Bearing in mind that improvements in targeting and discrimination, and miniaturization of drone and
weapon involve incremental improvements. If progress is only made one small step at a time, and if point
A is considered a violation of the laws of war, or criminal or something similar – perhaps subject to human
rights civil litigation – the result will be that point B will be similarly a violation, as well C, D, E … Z.
This will be so even if Z is a radical reduction in collateral damage. This is a terrible set of incentives from
the standpoint of making war less destructive, and Congress should act to prevent them for taking hold.
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51. Congress should invite the CIA to share what it believes it can regarding
collateral damage involved in drone strikes.18
52. If, as some commentators have suggested, the use of force threshold is gradually
shifting toward smaller and more discrete uses of force by US actors, made
possible by evolving drone technologies, then Congress should revisit the rules
regarding oversight, review, and accountability to ensure that they take account of
emerging realities about the use of force as perhaps a substitute – and highly
desirable substitute – for large scale overt war.
53. Congress should make clear that it rejects utterly the argument made popular in
the press in recent months that drone warfare is somehow dishonorable or that it
somehow reduces the disincentives for the US to use violence, or that it makes
violence too easy for the United States because its forces are not at risk, with the
barely concealed implication that if American servicemen and women are not
actively at risk of getting killed, because drones make it possible to take the fight
to the enemy without having to fight through whole countries on the ground to get
there – that drone warfare, that is, is somehow illegitimate, dishonorable,
unlawful, or an enabler of the US to let loose its unrestrained propensity to use
violence. It is none of those things, and Congress should say so.19
54. Conclusion
55. I thank the Subcommittee, chairman and members, for this opportunity testify.
Please be in touch with me should you have any further questions or seek
additional views.

Kenneth Anderson
April 28, 2010, Washington DC
kanders@wcl.american.edu

18

It is highly evident, from interviews and off-the-record statements from senior intelligence officials from
Director Panetta on down, that the CIA believes that the collateral damage is far less than what various
organizations are reporting. If that is so, it should do far more to make that information available. For that
matter, the CIA should consider private discussions to share such data with the International Committee of
the Red Cross, on a private basis.
19
This idea, introduced so far as I can tell by Peter W. Singer in his influential book, Wired for War, and
popularized by journalist Jane Mayer in an influential article in The New Yorker (October 26, 2009), is in
my view wrong as a matter of how the intelligence agencies and US military actually operate, in fact, and
in any case implies a moral view of the “efficient” risk of US service personnel lives that I should think
Members of Congress would find repugnant at best. It is dismaying, however, how many organizations and
writers seem to find it a satisfying meme.
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